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Abstract: In 1889 the Shelton Iron, Steel and Coal Company Limited was incorpo-
rated to take over the assets and business activities of two existing companies. To 
guide the contracting parties in negotiating a price to be paid for the properties 
belonging to the Shelton Collieries and Ironworks an independent valuation was 
arranged by Deloitte, Dever, Griffiths & Co., later appointed auditors of the new 
company. The article comprises an appraisal of the valuation exercise, which is 
an early example of the use of a discounted cash flow technique to provide rele-
vant information for a capital investment decision. 
Discounted cash flow (DCF) criteria have been applied to insur-
ance matters and financial investments for several centuries, but 
it is only during the present century that they have gained wide-
spread theoretical acceptance for capital investment purposes. 
Capital value theory was developed by economists such as Irving 
Fisher and Alfred Marshall in the 1920s, leading to formal exposi-
tions of the net present value (NPV) rule and the internal rate of 
return (IRR) model by P. A. Samuelson and K. Boulding respective-
ly in the 1930s.1 However, employment of these techniques as part 
of the decision-making process within United Kingdom companies 
is not as widespread as might be expected and is sometimes sup-
posed to be the case. G. D. Newbould's study of takeover and 
merger activity in the late 1960s2 showed that none of the com-
panies included in his survey had made use of DCF techniques to 
value an enterprise, either as a means of assessing the viability of 
a prospective investment or as a means of retaliating against a 
low bid. The most popular methods of valuation, identified by 
Newbould, were book or market values of assets and current market 
prices of securities. Comparison of price earnings ratios was also 
favoured as a means of assessing a prospective investment. Judged 
theoretically, each of these methods is considered to be sub-optimal. 
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Book and market values of assets bear no necessary relationship 
to future earnings capacity, the market price of a security reflects 
only the value of a minority interest, whilst the price earnings ratio 
is based on past earnings. 
Why have these inherent errors of principle not deterred com-
panies from using sub-optimal valuation methods in preference to 
the theoretically pre-eminent DCF techniques? The reasons have not 
changed since they were first identified by Bonbright in the 1930s.3 
Forecasting future cash flows and selecting a suitable discount rate 
are subjective exercises difficult to defend in law. Forecasting future 
cash flows inevitably involves a strong element of crystal-ball 
gazing and, instead of a series of known returns, estimates used 
will be, at best, a range of possible outcomes dependent upon the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of Various future events. Moreover 
the discount rate which, in theory, should represent the risk-free 
rate of interest plus a premium for risk, both unknowns, must, in 
practice, also be estimated. The effect of these practical difficulties 
is that DCF techniques have come to be regarded, by many busi-
nessmen, as academic ideals with little relevance to the imperfect 
market in which firms operate. It is therefore interesting to discover 
that as early as 1889, well before the techniques had achieved even 
widespread academic recognition, use was being made of DCF 
valuation procedures in an uncontested merger. 
An Early Application of the DCF method 
Two enterprises, Lord Granville's Shelton Collieries and Iron-
works (SCI) and the Shelton Iron and Steel Company Limited (SIS), 
agreed to join together to form the Shelton Iron, Steel and Coal 
Company Limited (SISC).4 To guide the contracting parties in 
negotiating the price to be paid for SCI, Messrs. Deloitte, Dever, 
Griffiths & Co., later appointed auditors of SISC, arranged for 
William Craig of Cheshire5 to value the property belonging to the 
former company. The detailed terms of reference given to Craig 
are repeated in his report dated 16 July 1889 and include the re-
quirements to advise on "the condition of the . . . [properties] . . . 
and on their present value."6 
Model Employed. The basic model used by Craig for the purpose 
of computing the DCF value is, in essence, identical with the theo-
retical model recommended today. Craig forecasts future cash 
flows based on recent past results and his assessment of the various 
factors which might be expected to alter these results in the future 
and, second, estimates a suitable discount rate which, when applied 
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to the cash flows, produces a figure for present value.a A prelimi-
nary criticism which might be directed at Craig's report is that it 
does not incorporate a calculation of the break up value of the 
business, i.e., the lowest price that the vendor should be willing to 
accept for the sale of the enterprise as a going concern. Nor does 
he estimate the maximum price the rational purchaser will pay, 
namely the replacement cost of an enterprise possessing a similar 
earning capacity. However, these matters were not explicitly in-
cluded in the terms of reference given to Craig. The owners of 
the merging concerns were, of course, maintaining their proprie-
torial links as shareholders of the new concern.7 This suggests 
that a policy decision had been made to continue investing in the 
manufacture of iron and steel and, except in the unusual circum-
stance of the break up value exceeding replacement cost, the 
calculation of these upper and lower limits would have served no 
useful purpose. 
The practical difficulties encountered by Craig when attempting 
to apply the theoretical model to a real business situation were no 
different from those facing investment appraisers today. It is there-
fore interesting to consider how he tackled the problem, the extent 
to which his figures were relied upon for price-fixing purposes, and 
the degree of success achieved by a comparison with subsequent 
events. These matters are examined below. 
Methodology 
The early part of the report lists and describes the various leases, 
pits and blast furnaces which comprised the undertaking.8 The 
effect of using this approach is to divide the entire enterprise into 
a number of separate and distinct parts as the basis for the valua-
tion exercise, the results of which are summarised in Table I. 
Cash Flows: Collieries. For each of the pits the present rate of 
working and the reserves yet unworked are identified.9 In accord-
ance with his terms of reference, Craig next assesses the financial 
implications of opening up several new workings on the leasehold 
properties.10 Inclusion of the expected financial effects of develop-
ment proposals for the collieries is explained in two ways. First, 
the enterprise was obliged under the terms of its two-leases to sink 
an extra three pits within certain time limits and, second, since 
aCraig's exercise would seem to compare favourably with another early (1915) 
attempt at investment appraisal for which some sophistication is claimed by George 
A. Wing, in his article "Capital Budgeting, Circa. 1915," but which uses only sim-
ple interest tables to compute present values. 
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Table 1 
Present value of SCI per Craig's Report dated 16 July 1889 
Years Cash Discount Value at Discount Present Value 
Flow Rate End of Rate 
Year 7 
£ % £ % £ £ 
COLLIERIES 
Duchy Lease, 
30 years: 
Present Workings 1-30 14,646p.a. 15 96,165 
Additional Revenue 
from Opening 
New Pits, Com-
mencing Year 8 8-30 14,854p.a. 15 95,051 7 59,056 
Cost of 
Development 1-7 3,751 p.a. 5 (20,661) 38,395 
End Value of Plant 30 50,000 5 11,550 
Sneyd Lease, 
40 years: 
Revenue from De-
veloping Lease, 
Commencing 
Year 8 8-40 30,000p.a. 15 198,000 7 123,294 
Cost of 
Development 1-5 9,000p.a. 5 (38,961) 84,333 
End Value of Plant 40 15,000 5 2,130 
232,573 BLAST 
FURNACES Perpetuity 5,000 10 50,000 
COPY HOLD 
LAND 30 12,000 5 2,772 
£285,345 
Source: Craig, pp. 28, 29 and 35. 
several of the pits currently in use were almost worked out new 
mines needed to be opened up in order to maintain present levels of 
production. The potential of the new pits was estimated from geo-
logical surveys and detailed information regarding conditions of 
working the same seams of coal and ore by neighbouring concerns. 
In Craig's judgment11 the new pits could be expected to yield a 
more valuable class of coal under easier mining conditions and, 
therefore, prove more profitable than existing workings.12 In esti-
mating cash flows from present workings and new developments, 
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Craig uses average prices ruling during the twelve months immedi-
ately prior to the date of the valuation exercise, but he does con-
sider the implications of the following expected future developments 
in the price of coal and wages rates paid to colliers. 
1. The price of coal had been comparatively low for twelve years 
but during the last six months there had been some improve-
ment and Craig was of the opinion that the higher current 
prices would be maintained in the future.13 A repetition of 
the overproduction of coal which occurred in the 1870s was 
considered improbable as, from that bitter experience, mine 
owners had learned that such a situation was disastrous for 
the supplier.14 
2. Owing to the passage of the Mines Regulations Act of 1887, 
which restricted the employment of inexperienced and there-
fore lower paid colliers, an increase in business operating 
costs was forecast.15 However, Craig argued that any result-
ing rise in wage rates would be substantially offset by the 
lower cost of working the new pits. 
Overall, the only significant departure, from the pattern of costs 
and revenues used for valuation purposes, which Craig considered 
likely to occur, was the possibility that future coal prices would 
be higher than the previous year's average prices; i.e. a conserva-
tive valuation was implied. 
Cash Flows: Blast Furnaces. It is when we turn to the valuation 
of the blast furnaces that it becomes more difficult to reconcile 
Craig's calculations with available factual evidence.16 During the 
period 1885-89 an aggregate loss of £28,786 arose from operating 
the blast furnaces, but during the six years prior to 1885 trading 
results had been more favourable and he uses the overall returns 
for the period 1879-89 to produce an average annual profit of 
£2,858. Still not satisfied, Craig points out that iron prices had been 
low for a number of years but were, in his opinion, now showing 
signs of improvement. This, he feels, justifies using an average 
annual revenue of £5,000 for capitalisation purposes. One reason 
for averaging returns over a number of years, as a basis for future 
projections, might be to avoid distortions which would be caused 
by the existence of cyclical fluctuations in trading activity. No 
suggestion was made in the report that this was the intention. In-
deed it is perhaps more instructive, to note the inconsistency be-
tween the blast furnace valuation, based on average results over 
a ten-year period, and the valuation of coal, based on profits earned 
5
Edwards and Warman: Discounted cash flow and business valuation in a nineteenth century merger: A note
Published by eGrove, 1981
42 The Accounting Historians Journal, Fall, 1981 
during the previous twelve months thus ignoring the less favour-
able results arising previously from coal. 
Discount Rates. It is probably in the choice of discount rates that 
Craig's analysis is weakest in theory compared with present day 
DCF criteria. It is generally accepted that the rate used should be a 
function of the perceived risk attaching to the cash flows from the 
investment, and that the assessment of that risk and the calculation 
of the risk premium must be a subjective exercise based primarily 
on the valuer's judgment. The discount rate in DCF calculations 
represents an estimate of the opportunity cost of employing funds 
in an investment of a particular risk class. It would therefore seem 
appropriate, when valuing a business concern, to consider one rate 
as applicable to the enterprise as a whole, given its overall risk 
class. Table 1 shows that Craig selects different rates not only for 
separate departments but also (1) for cash outlays and inflows rela-
ting to a single project, and (2) for different time periods within the 
same stream of cash inflows. This means that Craig has a range 
of discount rates, each adjusted according to the risk and un-
certainty which he perceives for each stream of cash flows and for 
each time period. In all he makes use of four different rates, 5% 
for cash outlays, 15% for revenue from the collieries, further dis-
counted at 7% where there is a seven year delay before revenue 
begins to emerge, and 10% for revenue from the blast furnaces. 
Each of these rates includes a premium over what may be con-
sidered the risk-free rate of interest in July 1889. For instance, the 
bank rate at that date was 2½%,17 although it did fluctuate between 
2½% and 6% during the latter part of the nineteenth century. It 
is likely that, in fixing the risk premiums, Craig had in mind the 
returns achieved by similar concerns in the locality with which he 
was closely acquainted. 
Once again it is the blast furnaces which receive the most 
favourable treatment. Despite his already optimistic assessment 
regarding the revenues likely to arise from that source, Craig intro-
duces further upward bias by applying a discount rate of 10%, 
compared with 15% for coal reserves. 
Values Employed 
In the event, Craig's valuations were not used as the direct basis 
for fixing the price paid to Earl Granville, the sole proprietor of SCI. 
The prospectus published to advertise an issue of preference 
shares and debentures by the acquiring company (SISC), at the 
time of its incorporation, includes reference to Craig's valuation of 
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Granville's "properties at £285,345 exclusive of stocks of coal and 
ironstone and stores,"18 but this is cited presumably only as evi-
dence of the conservative nature of the figures actually used. 
Separate agreements attached to SISC's memorandum of associa-
tion, dated December 1889, show that the sale of SCI was "carried 
out upon the basis of the balance sheet of the said business at the 
30th day of June 1889"19 and that the sale of SIS was "carried out 
upon the basis of the balance sheet of the said business at the 3rd 
day of August 1889."20 Balance sheets of the vendor companies ap-
pear not to have survived, but the figures at which the assets were 
initially accounted for by SISC are clearly set out in the unpublished 
balance sheet of that concern dated 31 December 1889, and this 
document includes £257,119 for the properties belonging to SCI.21 
Although one may have major reservations concerning the eco-
nomic significance of the asset values which were used for the 
purpose of fixing prices payable to the vendors, it must be remem-
bered that the method of business combination being discussed is 
in the nature of a "pooling of interests" rather than an acquisition. 
It is true that external sources of finance amounting to £250,000 
(£100,000 debentures and £150,000 preference shares) were raised 
at the time SISC was formed, of which £220,00022 was paid out to 
Granville and the shareholders of SIS whose proprietary interests 
were correspondingly reduced.23 Nevertheless, the entire equity 
interest in SISC continued in the hands of individuals who had 
been proprietors of the merged concerns. This, together with the 
fact that there was no major disparity between the size and scale 
of operations of the merged concerns, would cause the event to be 
accounted for in some countries today, though not in Great Britain,24 
on the "pooling" basis. It is also true that, at SISC, one accounting 
characteristic of pooling was absent, namely the carrying forward 
of the retained earnings of the amalgamating companies as the 
retained earnings of the resulting entity; however, the other charac-
teristic was clearly present, viz. the carrying forward of the book 
values of assets belonging to the amalgamating companies to the 
new concern. Consequently it would seem that we have an early, 
albeit partial, example of pooling based on the idea that the ac-
counting value of assets is not affected by the legal formality of 
transferring them to a "new" owner where there is no real change 
in the proprietary interest. This is not to suggest that those re-
sponsible for merging the activities of SCI and SIS were consciously 
pioneering any radical development in accounting theory and prac-
tice. Indeed, the main virtue of the treatment adopted may have 
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been its easy application and firms elsewhere may well have been 
doing much the same.25 
The effect of using the figures in SCI's balance sheet, at 30 June 
1889, was to value the company at the historical costs incurred in 
acquiring and developing properties prior to that date. The ques-
tion arises: why did the contracting parties choose not to use 
Craig's valuation for price-fixing purposes? In the absence of avail-
able evidence, we can only speculate on their possible motives. 
Craig's calculations were based on two series of cash flows, namely 
amounts expected to accrue from property presently being worked 
and amounts expected to accrue from the development of leases 
to be taken over by SISC. Although it is perfectly legitimate to in-
corporate both series in the valuation exercise, particularly as the 
leaseholder was obliged to undertake development expenditure 
under the terms of the leases, it does not follow that the purchaser 
will be willing to pay the figure which results. In view of the con-
siderable uncertainty attaching to cash flows based on develop-
ment expenditure yet to be undertaken, the purchaser might well 
argue for a lower figure, possibly based on present production 
potential. Table I shows a total value of £232,573 for the collieries, 
and this includes £96,165 attributable to present workings. One at-
tractive feature of the collieries' figure of £189,611,26 appearing 
in the balance sheet of SCI, could have been that it fell at a con-
venient point between those two valuations. 
The figure of £50,000 described as "plant, machinery, furniture, 
goodwill etc." in the agreement between SCI and SISC, is interest-
ing. This item covers the six blast furnaces owned by Granville's 
concern, a fact which might help to explain Craig's determination 
to place a similar valuation on the furnaces despite a five-year 
history of continuous loss making. An alternative explanation for 
the coincidence of figures is that, as the agreement between SCI 
and SISC was signed towards the end of 1889, the £50,000 valua-
tion was written into the balance sheet of the former concern after 
Craig had made his report, dated 16 July 1889. 
The book values on which the prices paid to the vendors were 
based, and which appear in the 31 December 1889 balance sheet 
of SISC, were soon abandoned. It is not surprising that manage-
ment should have wished to make some adjustment to the hetero-
geneous selection of figures transferred from SCI and SIS. For in-
stance, there is evidence which shows that many of the figures 
attached to assets taken over from SIS represented expenditure 
incurred, at various stages during the previous twenty-five years, 
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to which no adjustment had been made subsequent to the date of 
acquisition.27 A revaluation of the assets taken over was reported 
to the company's auditors in a letter dated 19th January 1891.28 This 
exercise resulted in a significant reallocation of book values be-
tween asset accounts and produced a shortfall of £30,000 which 
was debited to goodwill.29 
An Ex Post View of Craig's Valuation 
The difficult problems inherent in achieving a precise assessment 
of present value, namely accurately forecasting future cash flows 
and identifying the right discount rate, are well understood. This 
being so, it might seem churlish to concern ourselves overmuch 
with an examination of the actual results achieved by SISC in the 
years immediately following incorporation, particularly in view of 
the early stage at which these fairly sophisticated calculations were 
being attempted. Nevertheless, post fact evaluation of earlier busi-
ness decisions is an important, if sometimes neglected, aspect of 
management's learning process, and this is sufficient justification 
for considering forecasts in the light of actual results. 
There are practical difficulties which prevent us from carrying 
out a detailed comparison, at the company level, of forecast results 
with actual results achieved. First, SISC was formed to carry on the 
combined activities of two existing companies and, although the 
management accounting system of SISC calculated the profit or loss 
for each department,30 a further analysis of results between the 
assets of each of SISC's forerunners was probably considered ir-
relevant and was not made. A second difficulty arises because "the 
system of arriving at interdepartmental costs was altered from 
January 1st, 1891, the basis of charging at market price being 
changed for that of charging at cost price."31 This change in the 
company's system of pricing transfers between departments was 
made at the instigation of the company's auditors, Deloitte, Dever, 
Griffiths & Co.,32 who had expressed concern with a method of 
account keeping which made it impossible to establish the actual 
cost of stock when preparing the annual balance sheet.b 
bStrict application of the realisation concept might be desirable for the purpose 
of external reporting but its use within the management information system may 
be more difficult to justify. The result of the change made at SISC was that trans-
fers of materials between the collieries, blast furnaces, and iron and steel making 
departments were made at cost, instead of market price which had been used pre-
viously. The effect was that, henceforth, internal accounting reports contained less 
useful measures of the absolute and relative profitability of each department, e.g. 
assuming the market price of surplus coal sold to outsiders exceeded cost, the re-
9
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Despite these obstacles certain ex post observations can be 
made relevant to Craig's valuation. For the sixteen years following 
incorporation, SISC did little better than breakeven, and it was only 
the favourable conditions for iron and steelmaking created by the 
First World War which saw SISC enjoy a period of sustained pros-
perity.33 During the two-and-a-half years following incorporation the 
reported results were poor and prospects were sufficiently un-
favourable to cause one of the company's shareholders to criticise 
the amount paid to the vendors.34 Moreover, the company's chair-
man, when addressing the sixth annual general meeting, admitted 
that the period since incorporation had been one of depression 
following earlier prosperity,35 and the point has been made else-
where36 that the reported results of SISC, prior to 1910, would have 
been even worse but for the failure to make regular charges to 
reflect the depreciation of fixed assets. 
In order to obtain a clearer idea of whether the poor results 
achieved following incorporation should have been foreseen, we 
must re-examine Craig's valuations in the light of subsequent events. 
Collieries. In 1891 Emmerson Bainbridge of Sheffield was asked 
by the Board37 to inspect the mining properties and advise on their 
"present condition and prospects."38 His report, dated 2 November 
1891, begins by drawing attention to the fact that "the company 
was formed just at a time when the temporary inflation of the Coal 
and Iron trade was at the best."39 An important assumption on which 
Craig's projections were based was proven wrong by subsequent 
events. He expected the recent recovery in coal prices to continue, 
whereas for six years during the 1890s the average price of coal 
was significantly below that ruling in 1889.40 It is likely that this 
forecasting error was partly offset by two factors—(1) wage rates, 
which were tied to the price of coal by the sliding scale,41 also 
fell42 and (2) over the full forecasting period coal prices were higher 
than had previously been the case.43 Regarding the price paid for 
the collieries, Bainbridge makes the following critical observations: 
I may add at this point (although it may not be within the 
province of my Report) that considering the outlay upon 
new works which has for sometime been understood to be 
necessary, and the stipulation of the leases, and the need 
for opening out new Coalfields, the value placed upon 
suits of the collieries were understated and those of the iron and steel making de-
partments overstated, judged by comparison with today's generally accepted ac-
counting procedures for measuring profit. 
10
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these Collieries at the time the Company acquired them 
was in my opinion very much beyond their actual worth.44 
We have seen that the figure for the collieries, appearing in the 
balance sheet used as the basis for fixing the price paid to the 
vendor, was £189,611.45 This is well below Craig's valuation of 
£232,573, which incorporates the expected financial effects of future 
developments under the lease. Indeed, the value Craig placed on 
present workings, £95,165, was probably much nearer what Bain-
bridge would have considered an appropriate price. 
Blast Furnaces. Doubt has already been cast on whether the 
£50,000 valuation placed on the blast furnaces was the result of an 
entirely objective estimation process. For the four years prior to 
the date of Craig's report, losses had been running at an average 
annual level of £7,196. Craig's optimistic assumption that prices 
would rise sufficiently to convert this loss into an annual profit 
of £5,000 proved unjustified as it was a further ten years before 
iron prices began to improve.46 This is not something which is clear 
only with the benefit of hindsight. Following Bessemer's discoveries 
in the 1860s there had been a rapid substitution in demand of steel 
for iron and, as early as 1863, the ironmaster William Crawshay had 
remarked that "the star of the iron trade was setting fast."47 In 
mitigation of Craig's assessment, it must be said that Jeremiah 
Head, who was asked to investigate and report on the various de-
partments in 1892, gave no indication either that the iron making 
potential was in poor condition48 or that it was overvalued.49 Also, 
the managers at SISC must have considered it undervalued at 
£50,000 for, when the purchase consideration was reallocated, a 
figure of £60,250 was included for the blast furnaces.50 
Summary and Conclusion 
The inconsistency of using a single year's results as a basis for 
projections in the case of the collieries, while for the blast furnaces 
a ten-year average was calculated, has been pointed out. The use 
of a number of different interest rates depending on the nature 
and duration of estimated cash flows has also been criticised. 
Apart from these two weaknesses, we consider the mechanics of 
Craig's valuation exercise to be satisfactory. The underlying as-
sumptions on which the calculations were based, however, turned 
out to be wrong. The rise in the price of coal in the first half of 
1889 was a temporary phenomenon and not part of the continuous 
trend which Craig assumed. In addition, iron prices remained de-
11
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pressed throughout the 1890s, instead of rising sufficiently to con-
vert losses into profits as Craig had hoped. Some doubt has also 
been cast on the relevance, for price-fixing purposes, of a valuation 
based on income projections, a major portion of which may arise 
only if additional capital is raised and future investment decisions 
are undertaken. As it turned out, the only use made of Craig's 
estimate of present value was to demonstrate, to new investors 
brought in at the time SISC was incorporated, the conservative 
nature of the basis actually used. 
One possible explanation for the contracting parties' ultimate 
decision to use balance sheet values for price-fixing purposes is 
that, unlike Craig's figures, they take no explicit account of the 
potential value accruing to new work. However, balance sheet 
values based on the accounting concept of historical cost are today 
regarded as an unsound basis for resource allocation decisions. 
This may not have been the case in 1889, though it is more likely 
that the combined balance sheet values of SIS and SCI happened 
to approximate "real" values, and it was considered convenient to 
use them pending a revaluation of the entire concern. An alternative 
explanation, put forward for the decision to employ balance sheet 
values, is that the strong element of continuity of ownership justified 
the use of a modified version of the pooling of interests basis of 
accounting for mergers. 
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capital theory, pp. 64-68. 
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Accounting Standards Committee in 1971. 
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26NWRRC/472/book 53/fo. 22. 
27Edwards, J. R., pp. 243-244. 
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29NWRRC/472/book 32/fo. 69. 
30NWRRC/472/book 53/fo. 26, letter from Deloitte, Dever, Griffiths & Co. dated 
23rd June, 1890. 
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1892. 
32NWRRC/472/book 53/fo. 22, letter from Deloitte, Dever, Griffiths & Co. dated 
23rd June, 1890. 
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34Staffordshire Sentinel, 13th April, 1892, comment by Mr. Lyon, shareholder, at 
the second ordinary meeting of SISC. 
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